Source: D. Bankier, The German and the Final Solution (Oxford, 1992), pp.37-42.
Thus far we have concentrated on the radicals. Let us now consider the effect of the wave of anti-Semitism on the general public. A major purpose of the campaign was to mobilise the apathetic public and particularly to raise the morale of its disaffected sectors. The pragmatic value of tacking the Jewish question and manipulating it for purposes of political integration is best exemplified by the words of Gauteirer Grohe in his report for February 1935: 'More articulate propaganda against shopping in Jewish stores will not only suit our principles, but also raise the somewhat depressed mood of the lower middle class.' 36 . He set an example by calling for the boycott of Jewish stores at Cologne's Spring Fair in March.
An examination of the press in these months shows that this was far more than a local initiative. In the Rhineland Grohe incited attacks upon people buying from Jewish stores; Sprenger urged a renewed fight against the Jews in Frankfurt, and Streicher pushed the anti-Semitic drive in Nuremberg. Sounding his own praise, Grohe wrote in his March report:
The increase of the party's activities was due to a more harsh and minute treatment of the Jewish question. Apart from being a matter of principle and awakening the racial instinct through its treatment, the topics of the Jewish question, department stores, Jewish shops, etc., restored morale to the resigned lower middle class' 37 .
There is a reason why Grohe was so eager to please this segment of the population. The Duesseldorf report for February noted the low morale among shopkeepers owing to the downturn in sales, at a time when price controls had reduced profit margins and a wage freeze had diminished the public's purchasing power. Small shopkeepers also complained that the party did not actively help them survive by destroying the Jewish owned department stores 38 . The head office of the Gestapo in Saxony likewise noted that this group criticised the government for not having nationalised the department stores as promised and for making the situation even worse through the prices policy of the Reich Food Estate, by allowing the food stamps of the winter aid campaign to be redeemed in department stores. Further, the middle classes claimed that the army was still ordering some of its supplies from Jews, and that, when department stores were taken over by Germans, they were not given to small shopkeepers 39 . It was thus crucial for the leadership to regain the faith of this class, which was one of the Nazis' main pillars.
What about the rest of society, however? It would appear that all gains to national honour in the field of foreign affairs - such as the overwhelming victory in the plebiscite over the Saar, and the renewal of conscription for army service - had only a brief impact on the public, and so did little to advance political socialisation and conformity. People were more concerned about their day-to-day problems. Likewise, anti-Semitic slogans could not distract attention from the deteriorating economic situation, and the violence perpetrated by the extremists, particularly against the churches, simply made matters worse. It failed to galvanise the population for a massive campaign against the Jews, and the breaches of law and order increased rather than diminished disaffection with the regime. It was clear to all that this situation could not remain static. As the Berlin chief of police put it in his report for May and June, people were in a mood to expect harsh measures from the government 40 . The August report from Berlin urges public clarification of the Jewish question, demanded both by the party and by the population at large 41 . The party's attempts at mass mobilisation during July and August 1935 produced a wearied response from the public. On the eve of the party's annual rally in September in Nuremberg, indifference turned into hostility and signs of disappointment with the regime dramatically increased. To a certain extent this happened even in sectors which had strongly supported the Nazi Party. From Berlin, for instance, we learn that the party was being shunned not only by opportunists, but also by ΓÇ£true believersΓÇ¥. The commentator attributed this to the party's failure to carry out promises made during the struggle for power 42 . The Aachen Gestapo, summarising events in July, described a similar mood. The workers who had formerly supported the regime were embittered by frustration. In addition to disappointment over the failure to realise economic goals, there was sharp criticism of the radicals' rioting and the absence of a clear policy on the churches and the Jews 43 .
The seriousness of the situation is evident from the stereotyped expressions that the Nazi agents used to describe the public mood: ΓÇ£bad and unfavourableΓÇ¥; ΓÇ£continued deterioration of moodΓÇ¥; ΓÇ£considerably worsenedΓÇ¥; (increasing unhappiness'. In some regions the rift in relations between the regime and the public appears to have been so deep as to constitute a massive withdrawal of support. This was only natural: ordinary Germans wished to know where they stood and what rules they should follow, particularly with regard to the Jews; they did not want their routine suddenly disrupted by arbitrary actions by party activists" 44 .
The assessment that 'the mood has reached an all-time low', which we come across in reports from western regions, shows that the situation was especially serious in the Catholic areas. From Cologne and Koblenz we learn of deep disaffection; in Breslau the situation is reported to be at its worst since the Nazi take-over. The Aachen Gestapo commentator warns that it is not just his view that things are bad: observers all over the region had worrying reports 45 . The reason why these attitudes found a firmer footing in Catholic areas is obvious: the population feared a Kulturkampf as an extension of the persecution of the Jews. Mounted and motorised SA rode through the towns chanting not only anti-Jewish, but also anti-Catholic, slogans and songs.
The reports also indicate a steady rise in dissent, manifest in various rumours current at the time. This point deserves closer attention, since in a regime of this kind, where the state has a monopoly on information, the analysis of rumours is an important gauge of public mood. The very existence of rumours, despite the barrages of propaganda, shows that the public's senses cannot be completely dulled, and that large parts of the population retain their critical independence despite the risks. In dictatorships, rumours are a token compensation for political impotence. They express anxieties, hopes and expectations which have no other outlet, and act as a valve whereby people release their inner tensions. The intensity of rumours in Nazi Germany at this time points unmistakably to the stress people were under and to their general sense of insecurity, and so provides a fairly reliable indication of their feelings about the regime 46 . Various sources mention rumours that the regime was to be purged of the radical elements undermining public order, for there was a pressing need to end the state of lawlessness through definitive legislation on the Jewish question. In Dortmund and Magdeburg, for instance, we find rumours about an imminent clearing-away of radicals, patterned on the ΓÇ£night of the long knivesΓÇ¥ 47 . The Gestapo and Sopade reports show that the same sort of whispering went on in the Rhineland 48 . This persistent hearsay, reflecting the hopes of the population, is not to be misunderstood as indicating a rise in democratic trends among the German public; on the contrary, there is not the slightest hint that the waning of the Nazi Party's influence produced a desire for democracy. The country's anti-liberal traditions and the fear of political chaos were so firmly rooted that hopes for change were pinned on alternative anti-democratic forces. Many wanted the Nazis to be replacedby a military dictatorship. The Kassel Gestapo registered such a trend when it noted that reactionary cwere speaking of the government falling by winter 49 . In Magdeburg the local Gestapo reported that the population was hoping for an alliance between the army and the Stahlhelm to rout the Nazis and seize power 50 . In the Rhineland, the name of War Minister von Blomberg was being bandied about as that of an alternative leader to Hitler. Similar unsubstantiated rumours mirroring the public's hopes were circulating in Saxony: in Leipzig, for example, people were saying that local party officials, including the chief of police, the Kreisleiter and even the Reichstatthalter of Saxony, had been arrested and shot 51 .
The Sopade reports for these months give further evidence of this climate, but they do not contain a shred of evidence that people wanted a return to democracy. The socialist observers gained the impression that, in looking for a military take-over, what people really wanted was an end to the rioting and the restoration of law and order. They expected the traditional right wing and Catholic centre parties to play a crucial role in a new leadership that would quash what was commonly called ΓÇ£Bolshevism of the SwastikaΓÇ¥ (Hakenkreuzbolsrhewismus). Many wished a military commissar to be appointed alongside the Minister of the Interior to impose order by clamping down on the SS and the SA 52 . The Koblenz report pointed out the danger inherent in the political polarisation: 'Both the Stahlhelm and the SA look forward to a change in the political line and to violent campaigns' 53 .
Finally, the discontent found its most forcible expression in illegal leaflets disseminated by right-wing circles. Rumours circulated that Hitler had become a prisoner of the generals and that a military coup was imminent. The leaflets abound in slogans referring to the coming ΓÇ£Fourth ReichΓÇ¥, such as ΓÇ£The Stahlhelm fights in the Third Reich and rules in the FourthΓÇ¥, and ΓÇ£In the Third Reich we march, in the Fourth we ruleΓÇ¥ 54 . Other agents reported people singing verses such as the following:
Heil Hitler ist der deutsche Gruss;
Die Reichswehr steht Gewehr bei Fuss.
Blomberg wartet auf den grossen Krach,
Und dann sagen wir wieder 'Guten Tag'. 56
('Heil Hitler' is the German greeting;
The army's poised to give a beating.
Blomberg's waiting for the mighty fray,
And then we'll once more say 'Good day'.)
To what extent was Hitler aware of all this? It is hardly conceivable that he remained aloof; on the contrary, his policy-making was deeply affected. Realising how precarious the situation was and sensing the danger of letting current trends continue he had no option but to act to defuse the tension. It was no coincidence that the principal speeches delivered at the party congress in September related to internal politics, for the acute unrest caused by anti-Semitic agitation and violence sharpened the contradictions of the Nazi system. It particularly brought into relief the imbalance between the legal status of the Jews in Germany - and therefore also the practical limitations of the policies against them - and the pervasive hostility towards them. Three issues were at the centre of popular discontent and awaited resolution: Jewish access to German citizenship; the question of ΓÇ£race defilementΓÇ¥; and the boycott of Jewish enterprises. The need to clarify and define the status of the Jews in Germany was essential if the radical outbursts were to be stopped. It was plain to Hitler that the campaign against the Jews was so far advanced that the only way to control it was to legalise it. This was the reality, which preceded the rally of September 1935 and paved the way for the Nuremberg Laws. The racial laws served as a massive tranquilliser. They not only symbolised the exclusion of Jews from German society, but also provided a legitimisation of the preceding wave of riots and the arrests of Jews that had accompanied them. At the same time, they stopped the political instability that these riots had created.
37.Gauleiter Grohé, report Mar. 1935, ibid.; Juedische Rundschau , 19 Mar. 1935; Centralverein Zeitung , 21 Mar. 1935. On the conflict over Jewish shops and businesses see H. Genschel, Die Verdraengung der Juden aus der Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich (Bausteine zur Geschichtswissenschaft, Goettingen, 1966); U. Uhlig, Die Warenhaeuser im Dritten Reich (Westdeutscher Verlag, Cologne, 1956); R. Gellately, German shopkeepers and the rise of National Socialism', Wiener Library Bulletin , 28 (1974–5), pp. 31–40; H. A. Winkler, Der entbehrliche Stand. Zur Mittelstandspolitik im “Dritten Reich”', Archiv fuer Sozialgeschichte , 17 (1977), pp. 1–40, and From social protectionism to National Socialism. The German small-business movement in comparative perspective', Journal of Modern History , 48 (1976), pp. 1–18.
38.Gestapo Duesseldorf, report Feb. 1935; Genschel, Die Verdraengung , p. 87.
39.Gestapo Sachsen, report Jan. 1935, StA N, Polizei Direktion Nuernberg-Fuerth 430.
41.Gestapo Berlin, report Aug. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P.
42.Ibid.; RP Koblenz, report Aug.ΓÇôSep 1935, BA, R 18/1565; Gestapo Aachen, report July 1935, BA, R 58/662; Vollmer, Volksopposition, p. 255.
43.Gestapo Aachen, report July 1935, BA, R 58/662; Vollmer, Volksopposition, p. 255.
44.Gestapo Duesseldorf, report Aug. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P; Gestapo Berlin, report July 1935, ibid.; Gestapo Muenster, report July 1935, ibid.; Gestapo Osnabrueck, report July 1935, BA, R 58/672; RP Minden, report JulyΓÇôAug. 1935, BA, R 18/1566; Sopade, Aug. 1935, A 3, 5, 27, 35, 89; Deutsche Briefe , 43 (26 July 1935), 48 (30 Aug. 1935).
45.Gestapo Breslau, report July 1935, GStA, REP/90 P; Gestapo Koeln, report Aug. 1935, ibid.; Gestapo Aachen, report July 1935, BA, R 58/662.
46.Gestapo Dortmund, report July 1935, GStA, REP/90 P; Gestapo Magdeburg, report July 1935, ibid.; G. W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Doubleday, New York, 1958); G. W. Allport and L. Postman, The Psychology of Rumour (Henry Holt, New York, 1947).
47.Gestapo Dortmund, report July 1935, GStA, REP/90 P; Gestapo Magdeburg, report July 1935, ibid.
48.Gestapo Aachen, report July 1935, BA, R 58/662; Sopade, July 1935, A 3, (Rheinland-Westfalen), and Aug. 1935, A 26ΓÇô7 (Berlin).
49.Gestapo Kassel, report Aug. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P.
50.Gestapo Magdeburg and Schneidemuehl, reports on July 1935, GStA, REP/90 P; Sopade, Aug. 1935, A 26ΓÇô7.
51.Gestapo Aachen, report July 1935, BA, R 58/662; RP Koblenz, report JuneΓÇôJuly 1935, LHA, 401/28263; see also the rumours in Leipzig mentioned by Gestapo Sachsen, report July 1935, StA N, Polizei Direktion Nuernberg-Fuerth 430.
52.Sopade, Aug. 1935, A 3 (Bayern), A 5 (Suedwest), A 6 (Rheinland-Westfalen), A 7 (Nordwest), A 9 (Berlin), A 11 (Sachsen), A 27 (Schlesien).
53.RP Koblenz, report July 1935, LHA, 401/28263, On the nationalist-conservatives expectations of a Stahlhelm take-over see Gestapo Dortmund, report Feb. 1935, BA, R 58/1127; and G. van Roon, Widerstand und Krieg', in Juergen Schmaedeke and Peter Steinbach (eds), Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus (Piper, Munich, 1986), p. 56.
53.Sopade, July 1935, A 3 (Duesseldorf), A 5 (Schlesien); Gestapo Frankfurt a.d. Oder, report Aug. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P.
55.Gestapo Aachen, report July 1935, BA, R 58/662; RP Minden, report JulyΓÇôAug. 1935, BA, R 18/1566.
